The problems of communication which emerge also prompt us to consider the different forms of knowledge we develop about others and the world around us. Within these different reflections upon social action, Schutz stresses the incompleteness of our understanding of others and our heavy reliance on ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge which actors accumulate over time. In his characteristically thorough and specified manner, Schutz denoted various difficulties in Weber’s conceptualising of how we make sense of others and how we consider their motives. The first half of the chapter will consider key tenets of Schutz’s positive critique of Weber, which draws heavily on his critical reading of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. It is Weber’s understanding of social action, hinging around aspects of subjective meaning, which Schutz has so usefully scrutinised and developed. The point of departure for this chapter, as with Schutz’s social theory itself, is the work of Max Weber. This is shown for individual goals, whose inclusion via the recommended concepts of typification and relevance is suggested. (c) Sperber/Wilson overly restrict the range of experience powering their theory. Sperber/Wilson’s two-sided concept paves the way for a different concept meeting requirements identified in the article and captures the interlocking of routine and flexibility in interaction. (b) Schutz lacks a concise notion of relevance. Schutz’s idea of ongoing ‘typification’ is proposed as an amendment. Three differences between the theories are examined, and specific integrations encouraged: (a) The central problematic of inter-individual ascriptions of relevance remains underdeveloped with Sperber/Wilson.
Both investigate a dynamics of selectivity in experience making certain selections ‘relevant’ to an individual, which interactants exploit for coordination. of language), that people interact in context in a routine yet flexible way. Both theories, it is argued, aim to grasp and explain the fact, unaccounted for by code-like rules (e.g. The comparison is meant to strengthen both sides by integrating their advantages, and to prompt further discussion between these and other relevance accounts. Two seminal but unconnected relevance theories of communication are compared: one found in Alfred Schutz’s philosophy, and one developed by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson in a cognitive-science framework.
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